THE DIVISION-PROBLEM WITH SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES - A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE UNIFORM ALLOCATION RULE

被引：228

作者：

SPRUMONT, Y ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MONTREAL,CRDE,MONTREAL H3C 3J7,QUEBEC,CANADA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2938268

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：509 / 519

页数：11

共 10 条

[1] BENASSY JP, 1982, EC MARKET DISEQUILIB
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[3] Foley D., 1967, YALE ECON ESSAYS, V7, P45
[4] MANIPULATION OF VOTING SCHEMES - GENERAL RESULT
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[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (04) : 587 - 601
[5] TEMPORARY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM-THEORY
GRANDMONT, JM
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1977, 45 (03) : 535 - 572
[6] Hurwicz L., 1972, DECISION ORG, P297
[7] ON STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND SINGLE PEAKEDNESS
MOULIN, H
[J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1980, 35 (04) : 437 - 455
[8] STRATEGY-PROOF ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AT DIFFERENTIABLE POINTS
SATTERTHWAITE, MA
SONNENSCHEIN, H
[J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1981, 48 (04) : 587 - 597
[9] [No title captured]
[10] [No title captured]