OPTIMAL SANCTIONS WHEN INDIVIDUALS ARE IMPERFECTLY INFORMED ABOUT THE PROBABILITY OF APPREHENSION

被引：62

作者：

BEBCHUK, LA ^{[1
]}

KAPLOW, L ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NATL BUR ECON RES,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/467910

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：365 / 370

页数：6

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POLINSKY AM, 1991, AM ECON REV, V81, P618

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POLINSKY AM, 1979, AM ECON REV, V69, P880

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