UNILATERAL MOST-FAVORED-CUSTOMER PRICING - A COMPARISON WITH STACKELBERG

被引：15

作者：

NEILSON, WS

WINTER, H

机构：

[1] Texas A and M University, College Station, TX

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1992年 / 38卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(92)90059-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

If one firm in a price-setting duopoly adopts a most-favored-customer pricing policy, it can commit to a price which is higher than the Bertrand price. The equilibrium price, however, must be lower than the Stackelberg leader price.

引用

页码：229 / 232

页数：4