RENT DISSIPATION IN A LIMITED-ACCESS COMMON-POOL RESOURCE - EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE

被引：118

作者：

WALKER, JM ^{[1
]}

GARDNER, R ^{[1
]}

OSTROM, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] INDIANA UNIV,DEPT POLIT SCI,WORKSHOP POLIT THEORY & POLICY ANAL,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47405

来源：

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT | 1990年 / 19卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0095-0696(90)90069-B

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper examines group behavior in an experimental environment designed to parallel the conditions specified in noncooperative models of limited-access common-pool resources. Using experimental methods, we investigate the strength of theoretical models which predict that users of such resources will appropriate units at a rate at which the marginal returns from appropriation are greater than the marginal appropriation costs. Our results confirm the prediction of suboptimal accrual of rents and offer evidence on the effects of increasing investment capital available to appropriators. © 1990.

引用

页码：203 / 211

页数：9

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