TOWARD A THEORY OF DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING

被引：537

作者：

ABREU, D

PEARCE, D

STACCHETTI, E

机构：

[1] YALE UNIV,DEPT ECON,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520

[2] STANFORD UNIV,DEPT ENGN ECON SYST,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1990年 / 58卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2938299

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1041 / 1063

页数：23

共 23 条

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