This commentary addresses J. A. Bargh, S. Chaiken, R. Govender, and F. Pratto's (1992) conclusion that automatic attitude activation depends not on the idiosyncratic strength of the association in memory between an attitude object and an individual's evaluation of the object but on normative considerations constant across individuals. A variety of difficulties with the bases for this conclusion are discussed. Moreover, additional analyses of the J. A. Bargh et al. data reveal the superiority of an idiosyncratic measure of associative strength (a given individual's latency of response to an attitudinal inquiry) in predicting automatic attitude activation over the various normative measures (latency, extremity, ambivalence, polarization, and consensus or consistency) that were examined. These results support the theoretical premise that attitude activation varies as a function of position along an idiosyncratically defined attitude-nonattitude continuum.