PRICE-DISCRIMINATION THROUGH OFFERS TO MATCH PRICE

[1] Aumann R., 1974, J MATH ECON, V1, P67, DOI [10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8, DOI 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8]

[2] HOLT CA, 1985, EFFECTS ADV NOTICE B

[3] DEALING - TEMPORARY PRICE CUTS - BY SELLER AS A BUYER DISCRIMINATION MECHANISM [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1985, 58 (03) : 295 - 308

[4] KLEIN B, 1985, 388 U CAL DEP EC WOR

[5] LAZEAR EP, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P14

[6] Narasimhan C., 1984, MARKET SCI, V3

[7] A MODEL IN WHICH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SELLERS LEADS TO A HIGHER PRICE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1980, 48 (06) : 1575 - 1579

[8] NOISY MONOPOLIST - IMPERFECT INFORMATION, PRICE DISPERSION AND PRICE-DISCRIMINATION [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1977, 44 (03) : 393 - 406

[9] Salop S, 1986, NEW DEV ANAL MARKET, P265

[10] SCHMALENSEE R, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P242

[1] Aumann R., 1974, J MATH ECON, V1, P67, DOI [10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8, DOI 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8]

[2] HOLT CA, 1985, EFFECTS ADV NOTICE B

[3] DEALING - TEMPORARY PRICE CUTS - BY SELLER AS A BUYER DISCRIMINATION MECHANISM [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1985, 58 (03) : 295 - 308

[4] KLEIN B, 1985, 388 U CAL DEP EC WOR

[5] LAZEAR EP, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P14

[6] Narasimhan C., 1984, MARKET SCI, V3

[7] A MODEL IN WHICH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SELLERS LEADS TO A HIGHER PRICE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1980, 48 (06) : 1575 - 1579

[8] NOISY MONOPOLIST - IMPERFECT INFORMATION, PRICE DISPERSION AND PRICE-DISCRIMINATION [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1977, 44 (03) : 393 - 406

[9] Salop S, 1986, NEW DEV ANAL MARKET, P265

[10] SCHMALENSEE R, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P242