EFFORT, INCOME AND RANK: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

被引：1

作者：

Clark, Andrew ^{[1
,2
]}

Masclet, David ^{[3
,4
]}

Villeval, Marie-Claire ^{[5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] CNRS, PSE, 48 Blvd Jourdan, F-75014 Paris, France

[2] IZA PSE, F-75014 Paris, France

[3] CNRS, F-35065 Rennes, France

[4] CREM, F-35065 Rennes, France

[5] CNRS, GATE, F-69130 Ecully, France

[6] IZA GATE, F-69130 Ecully, France

来源：

REVUE ECONOMIQUE | 2006年 / 57卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.3917/reco.573.0635

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper reports on the results of a laboratory experiment aiming at investigating the effects of wage comparisons on effort. Individuals compare to each others and such comparisons do affect their decisions. For a given absolute wage, those who get a lower rank in the distribution decrease their level of effort. Their effort is also influenced by the evolution of both their wage and their relative position over time.

引用

页码：635 / 643

页数：9

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