PRIVATE INTEREST SUPPORT FOR EFFICIENCY ENHANCING ANTITRUST POLICIES

被引：8

作者：

BUCHANAN, JM ^{[1
]}

LEE, DR ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV GEORGIA,ATHENS,GA 30602

来源：

ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 1992年 / 30卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01654.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Recent discussions of antitrust based on the private interest theory of government conclude that the real, as opposed to the stated, purpose of antitrust legislation is to protect politically influential industries against competition. Yet several prominent antitrust scholars who accept the private interest theory of government in general see antitrust legislation serving the public interest by increasing competition. We argue that the private interest theory of government is consistent with the view that antitrust legislation promotes competition. Indeed antitrust legislation may be supported by organized interest groups because such legislation increases the competition they face.

引用

页码：218 / 224

页数：7