WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF EMISSION CREDIT TRADING PROGRAMS

被引：50

作者：

MALUEG, DA

机构：

[1] U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington

来源：

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT | 1990年 / 18卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0095-0696(90)90052-Z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The welfare consequences of moving from a command-and-control approach to pollution control to an emission credit trading program that attains the same environmental quality are shown to depend on the competitiveness of the output markets in which polluting firms compete. If the output markets are competitive, then the introduction of trading increases aggregate welfare. In contrast, if the output markets in which these firms participate are not competitive, then the adoption of an emission credit trading program may reduce social welfare. This is so even if emission credit markets are perfectly competitive. © 1990.

引用

页码：66 / 77

页数：12

共 23 条

[1] THE EMPIRICAL PROPERTIES OF 2 CLASSES OF DESIGNS FOR TRANSFERABLE DISCHARGE PERMIT MARKETS [J].