OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO PREVENT OIL-SPILLS - AN APPLICATION OF A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL WITH MORAL HAZARD

被引：69

作者：

COHEN, MA

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/467128

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：23 / 51

页数：29

共 30 条

[1]

BANKER RD, 1983, PRINCIPAL AGENT MODE

[2]

BANKER RD, 1983, VALUE CORPORATE SOCI

BEAVIS, B ;

WALKER, M .

[4] CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J].

BECKER, GS .

[5]

BRAGAW LK, 1980, MANAGING FEDERAL AGE

[6]

BRAVERMAN A, 1982, AM ECON REV, V72, P695

[7]

Burrows P, 1974, J PUBLIC ECON, V3, P251

[8] SOME EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY ON COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL STANDARDS [J].

CALFEE, JE ;

CRASWELL, R .

[9] THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OIL-SPILL PREVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT [J].

COHEN, MA .

[10]

COHEN MA, 1985, THESIS CARNEGIE MELL