OUTSIDE OPTIONS IN A BARGAINING MODEL WITH DECAY IN THE SIZE OF THE CAKE

被引：8

作者：

DALMAZZO, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV LONDON LONDON SCH ECON & POLIT SCI,LONDON WC2A 2AE,ENGLAND

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1992年 / 40卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(92)90137-N

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A simple bargaining model in which the cake decays over time at a positive rate is analysed. In the limit, the unique Perfect Equilibrium payoffs take the 'split-the-difference' form. (These results generalise to three-party bargaining.)

引用

页码：417 / 421

页数：5

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