EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF DISCLOSURE WITH AN OPPONENT

被引：18

作者：

KING, RR ^{[1
]}

WALLIN, DE ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] OHIO STATE UNIV,FISHER COLL BUSINESS,COLUMBUS,OH 43210

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 1995年 / 19卷 / 01期

关键词：

CONTRACTING; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND DISCLOSURE; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4101(94)00373-D

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper presents the results of 32 experimental markets designed to test hypotheses based on Wagenhofer's (1990) disclosure model. The model predicts the existence of multiple disclosure equilibria in cases where a manager balances the effects that disclosures can have on two sets of external agents: investors and an opponent. The experimental results support the partial-disclosure equilibrium over the full-disclosure option. Additionally, a lower level of disclosure was observed in those markets in which the discloser repeatedly interacted with information receivers. Lower disclosure reduces the level of proprietary costs which is beneficial to the information sender.

引用

页码：139 / 167

页数：29