THE INDUSTRIAL-ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS - OR, WHY LEGISLATURES, LIKE FIRMS, ARE NOT ORGANIZED AS MARKETS

被引:727
作者
WEINGAST, BR [1 ]
MARSHALL, WJ [1 ]
机构
[1] GOLDMAN SACHS & CO,NEW YORK,NY
关键词
D O I
10.1086/261528
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:132 / 163
页数:32
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