BERTRAND-EDGEWORTH DUOPOLY WITH PROPORTIONAL RESIDUAL DEMAND

被引：26

作者：

ALLEN, B

HELLWIG, M

机构：

[1] UNIV MINNESOTA,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455

[2] UNIV BASEL,CH-4051 BASEL,SWITZERLAND

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1993年 / 34卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2526949

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A complete characterization is given for the prices charged by Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolists with capacity constraints. In general, for the game in which firms' strategy spaces consist of price offers, Nash equilibrium involves nondegenerate mixed strategies. Equilibria never extend below the highest competitive price. With two firms, the Bertrand-Edgeworth model displays a bias for the highest of several market clearing prices. Moreover, these strategies never stop short of the lowest monopoly price. If firms are of unequal size, the larger firm assigns positive probability to a monopoly price, possibly even to several monopoly prices.

引用

页码：39 / 60

页数：22

共 17 条

[1] THE APPROXIMATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA BY BERTRAND-EDGEWORTH EQUILIBRIA IN LARGE MARKETS [J].