COMPETITIVITY IN AUCTION MARKETS - AN EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL INVESTIGATION

被引：33

作者：

FRIEDMAN, D ^{[1
]}

OSTROY, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 1995年 / 105卷 / 428期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2235318

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We report successive rounds of theory and laboratory experiment investigating price-taking behaviour and market efficiency. We focus on the impact of structural parameters as well as trading institution. The structural parameters involve non-competitive supply and demand, and a new odd-lot trading procedure for divisible goods. The trading institutions include the continuous double auction and the one-shot clearinghouse as well as a new quantities-only clearinghouse (CHQ) institution. We present and justify an as-if complete information theory which explains the competitive outcomes and which correctly predicts highly non-competitive outcomes in CHQ markets.

引用

页码：22 / 53

页数：32

共 41 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1957, GAMES DECIS

[2] ON COMPETITIVE MARKET MECHANISMS [J].