Logic of authentication

被引：1025

作者：

Burrows, Michael ^{[1
]}

Abadi, Martin ^{[1
]}

Needham, Roger ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ of Cambridge Computer Lab, United Kingdom

来源：

Operating Systems Review (ACM) | 1989年 / 23卷 / 05期

关键词：

Computer metatheory--Formal logic - Computer operating systems - Computer systems; Digital--Distributed - Data processing--Security of data;

D O I：

10.1145/74851.74852

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Authentication protocols are the basis of security in many distributed systems, and it is therefore essential to ensure that these protocols function correctly. Unfortunately, their design has been extremely error prone. Most of the protocols found in the literature contain redundancies or security flaws. A simple logic has allowed us to describe the beliefs of trustworthy parties involved in authentication protocols and the evolution of these beliefs as a consequence of communication. We have been able to explain a variety of authentication protocols formally, to discover subtleties and errors in them, and to suggest improvements. In this paper, we present the logic and then give the results of our analysis of four published protocols, chosen either because of their practical importance or because they serve to illustrate our method.

引用

页码：1 / 13