公私伙伴关系(PPP)之创新型投资激励效应研究

被引：2

作者：

唐祥来

机构：

[1] 南京财经大学财政与税务学院

来源：

山东经济 | 2010年 / 26卷 / 06期

关键词：

PPP; 创新型投资激励; 基础设施; 绑定;

D O I：

10.13962/j.cnki.37-1486/f.2010.06.015

中图分类号：

F275 [企业财务管理];

学科分类号：

摘要：

PPP是一种公共部门与私人部门之间关于资产供给和服务配置的合约安排。在不完全合约框架下,PPP模式激励第一阶段承包人潜在地投资于提高资产质量和成本节约上。如果创新型投资的外部性为正,任务绑定有利于企业将外部性内部化并提高社会总福利。资产所有权配置遵循资产的使用价值,即哪个集团使用资产的价值高,就应该拥有资产的所有权。外部融资对于创新型投资激励有正负两方面的影响,它在促成创新型投资激励目标的同时也增加了监管成本。

引用

页码：109 / 113

页数：5

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