State ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies

被引:9
作者
Mei Yu [1 ]
机构
[1] Birmingham City University
关键词
State ownership Firm performance Split Share Structure Reform China;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F121.2 [社会主义所有制形式]; F832.51 []; F224 [经济数学方法];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 020204 ; 0701 ; 070104 ; 1201 ;
摘要
While the relationship between state ownership and firm performance has been widely researched, the empirical evidence has provided mixed results. This study applies panel data regression techniques to 10,639 firm-year observations of nonfinancial Chinese listed firms during 2003–2010 to examine the relationship between state ownership and firm performance. The results show that state ownership has a U-shaped relationship with firm performance. The Split Share Structure Reform in2005–2006 played a positive role in enhancing the relationship between state ownership and firm profitability ratios. Although state ownership decreased significantly after 2006, it remains high in strategically important industry sectors such as the oil, natural gas and mining sector and the publishing, broadcasting and media sector. The findings reveal that a higher level of state ownership is superior to a dispersed ownership structure due to the benefits of government support and political connections. The Split Share Structure Reform made previously nontradable shares legally tradable, improving corporate governance and reducing the negative effect of non-tradable state shares.
引用
收藏
页码:75 / 87
页数:13
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