信任、忠诚与家族主义困境

My basic standpoint expressed in this paper is that, although TRUST has been defined in different aspects, there is no definition of TRUST that is aimed at depicting the cultural system characteristic of China, as opposed to the Western definition. In order to comprehend accurately the TRUST structure under the circumstances of Chinese culture, it is necessary to divide TRUST into social and individual. The social trust is founded on law and legal contracts, while private trust is an evolutionary process based on trust administration and coordinative games among individuals or organizations. Compared with the Western developed market economy, China lacks social trust while she has more private trust of which the market is cut apart, in other words, it is a "difference sequence structure"with discrimination against outsiders and in favor of insiders. In this article, this special trust structure is defined as "TRUST of CLANNISHNESS". Different from the Western general trust based on CONFIDENCE, this trust of clan system is built on LOYALTY. It can be discerned that, if described with Bryan's coordinative games, the clannish trust may result in the optimum Pareto Coordinative game, which can better solve the trust problem in agency. The clannish trust, however, cannot, or can hardly untangle problems of the lack of agent ability --the problems that crop up with the organizational scale or trade complexity increased, which are called CLANNISHNESS DELEMMA in this paper. And under special trade circumstances, the management by trust, as a choice made when the time is opportune, is determined, under the conditions of the specified cultural system, by the managerial cost structure.