Profit Allocation Scheme among Partners in Virtual Enterprises Based on Fuzzy Shapley Values

被引：2

作者：

陈雯 ^{[1
]}

张强 ^{[2
]}

王明哲 ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing , China

[2] Department of Management and Economics,China Institute of Industrial Relations,Beijing ,China

来源：

JournalofBeijingInstituteofTechnology | 2007年 / 01期

关键词：

virtual enterprises; (fuzzy) cooperative games; fuzzy Shapley values; representation principle;

D O I：

10.15918/j.jbit1004-0579.2007.01.025

中图分类号：

F224 [经济数学方法];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070104 ;

摘要：

Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on classical Shapley values and used to allocate profit among partners in virtual enterprises (VE). Axioms of the classical Shapley value are extended to Shapley values with fuzzy payoffs by using fuzzy sets theory. Fuzzy Shapley function is defined based on these extended axioms. From the viewpoint the allocation for each partner should be a crisp value rather a fuzzy membership function at the end of cooperation, a crisp allocation scheme based on fuzzy Shapley values is proposed.

引用

页码：122 / 126

页数：5