供应商/客户关系型交易、盈余管理与审计师决策

[1] 关系型交易、制度环境与外部审计需求——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验证据 [J]. 当代财经, 2015, (04) : 107 - 118

[2] 供应链集成影响上市公司财务绩效的实证研究 [J]. 会计研究, 2014, (02) : 49 - 56+95

[3] 供应商-客户关系与审计师选择 [J]. 会计研究, 2012, (12) : 81 - 86+95

[4] 高质量内部控制能抑制盈余管理吗?——基于自愿性内部控制鉴证报告的经验研究 [J]. 会计研究, 2011, (08) : 53 - 60+96

[5] 政治关系、制度环境与股票价格的信息含量——来自我国民营上市公司股价同步性的经验证据 [J]. 金融研究, 2011, (07) : 182 - 195

[6] 关系型投资与审计行为 [J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36 (05) : 16 - 26

[7] Relationship-Specificity, Contract Enforceability, and Income Smoothing[J] . The Accounting Review . 2013 (5)

[8] Relationship-Specific Investments and Earnings Management: Evidence on Corporate Suppliers and Customers[J] . Kartik Raman,Husayn Shahrur.The Accounting Review . 2008 (4)

[9] Earnings management through real activities manipulation [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2006, 42 (03) : 335 - 370

[10] Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 1 The financial support of Nomura Securities and Ernst & Young LLP is gratefully acknowledged. We appreciate the able research assistance of Dan Nunn. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Abbie Smith (the referee), Kevin Murphy, and workshop participants at Columbia University, the University of California – Los Angeles, the University of Colorado – Boulder, Harv[J] . John E. Core,Robert W. Holthausen,David F. Lar

[1] 关系型交易、制度环境与外部审计需求——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验证据 [J]. 当代财经, 2015, (04) : 107 - 118

[2] 供应链集成影响上市公司财务绩效的实证研究 [J]. 会计研究, 2014, (02) : 49 - 56+95

[3] 供应商-客户关系与审计师选择 [J]. 会计研究, 2012, (12) : 81 - 86+95

[4] 高质量内部控制能抑制盈余管理吗?——基于自愿性内部控制鉴证报告的经验研究 [J]. 会计研究, 2011, (08) : 53 - 60+96

[5] 政治关系、制度环境与股票价格的信息含量——来自我国民营上市公司股价同步性的经验证据 [J]. 金融研究, 2011, (07) : 182 - 195

[6] 关系型投资与审计行为 [J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36 (05) : 16 - 26

[7] Relationship-Specificity, Contract Enforceability, and Income Smoothing[J] . The Accounting Review . 2013 (5)

[8] Relationship-Specific Investments and Earnings Management: Evidence on Corporate Suppliers and Customers[J] . Kartik Raman,Husayn Shahrur.The Accounting Review . 2008 (4)

[9] Earnings management through real activities manipulation [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2006, 42 (03) : 335 - 370

[10] Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 1 The financial support of Nomura Securities and Ernst & Young LLP is gratefully acknowledged. We appreciate the able research assistance of Dan Nunn. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Abbie Smith (the referee), Kevin Murphy, and workshop participants at Columbia University, the University of California – Los Angeles, the University of Colorado – Boulder, Harv[J] . John E. Core,Robert W. Holthausen,David F. Lar