内生代理问题与信息不对称:日本风险投资机构投资治理特征分析

被引:2
作者
洪宇
机构
[1] 东北师范大学对外经济贸易学院吉林长春
关键词
风险投资; 投资治理; 信息不对称; 代理问题;
D O I
10.16123/j.cnki.issn.1000-355x.2003.06.006
中图分类号
F833.13 [];
学科分类号
1201 ; 020204 ;
摘要
风险投资机构作为金融中介,在消除外部投资者与企业家之间信息不对称的同时,又内生了新的信息不对称与代理问题。日本很多风险投资公司通过大量公司本体投资,用风险投资公司声誉替代风险投资家个人声誉,以向外部投资者暗示对自身投资治理能力的自信。降低信息不对称与代理成本能力的制约,也使日本附属型风险投资机构表现出投资后期化、放任型投资治理模式以及盲目投资竞争等特征。
引用
收藏
页码:22 / 27
页数:6
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