认证的可靠性:质量标志是消费者的政策工具

被引:2
作者
朱彧 [1 ]
邓少军 [2 ]
樊红平 [1 ]
Gabriele Jahn [3 ]
Matthias Schramm [3 ]
Achim Spiller [3 ]
机构
[1] 农业部农产品质量安全中心
[2] 中非发展基金
[3] The Institute of Agricultural Economics,University of Goettingen
关键词
认证; 质量标志; 政策工具;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F203 [生产行业管理];
学科分类号
020201 ;
摘要
目前在食品行业中存在数量众多的认证体系,但是与认证的经济学研究却很少。认证是在市场交易中可确保商品某种隐藏质量声明真实性的有效工具。在信息不对称的情况下,诸如有机生产、动物福利、公平贸易等"过程导向"的品质特性容易产生不正当使用标志问题。从长远来看,只有可靠的控制程序才能减少食品安全事件的发生。首先提出了一个影响认证结果和认证标志有效性的模型,然后探讨了认证市场价格战的趋势和认证制度变革的必要性,提出了减少对检查员的依赖程度、强化职责、增加公信力效应和降低认证费用等策略,最后讨论了对官方和非官方监管的政策内涵。
引用
收藏
页码:55 / 63
页数:9
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