基于转移支付契约的两级供应链低碳减排博弈分析

被引:2
作者
杨仕辉
范刚
机构
[1] 暨南大学经济学院
关键词
低碳减排; 供应链.TIF; Stackelberg博弈模型; 转移支付契约; 碳税;
D O I
10.13578/j.cnki.issn.1671-1556.2016.02.003
中图分类号
F274 [企业供销管理]; X32 [环境规划与环境管理]; F224.32 [博弈论];
学科分类号
1201 ;
摘要
在碳排放问题全球化的背景下,为了更好地实现低碳减排,假设消费者具有低碳偏好,政府对非减排企业征收碳税并对减排企业进行转移支付,且转移支付额度与低碳减排效率呈正相关的情况下,研究了单一供应商和制造商的两级供应链低碳减排问题。在Stackelberg博弈模型下,运用逆向求解法和利润最大化原则,求解得出供应链企业的最优决策组合、最优减排量、最优产量和利润,最后通过数值模拟方法检验模型在实践中的应用。结果表明:政府可以通过制定相应的碳税和合理的转移支付契约,实现供应链的联合减排,并促进供应链企业的低碳研发,从而改善市场失灵,恢复市场的自我调节功能。该研究可为政府制定低碳减排的宏观调控政策提供理论依据。
引用
收藏
页码:11 / 18
页数:8
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