不同政府补贴模式对制造商与零售商决策的影响

被引:6
作者
邱国斌
机构
[1] 南昌航空大学经济管理学院
关键词
政府补贴模式; 制造商; 零售商; 博弈;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F810.45 [财政支出]; F406 [工业企业组织与管理]; F715 [商业企业组织与管理];
学科分类号
020203 ; 120202 ; 020205 ; 1202 ; 0202 ;
摘要
基于政府补贴制造商和政府补贴消费者两种模式,建立制造商与零售商之间博弈模型,分析不同补贴模式对制造商与零售商的决策及其绩效的影响,并对不同补贴模式的刺激需求效果做比较分析。结果表明,基于消费者的角度,补贴制造商模式和补贴消费者模式都能够降低消费者的支出成本,消费者能从政府补贴中受益,并且补贴消费者模式对消费者更有利;基于政府的角度,补贴制造商模式对需求刺激的效果更好;基于企业的角度,补贴制造商模式对企业更有利。
引用
收藏
页码:12 / 24
页数:13
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