对横向监督理论的一个述评

被引:12
作者
章元
机构
[1] 复旦大学经济学院
关键词
横向监督; 激励; 团队;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F270 [企业经济理论和方法];
学科分类号
摘要
团队成员之间的横向监督对于提高团队生产效率有着重要的作用。相对于纵向监督而言,它是一种廉价的信息收集和处理机制,在减轻团队成员的“搭便车”行为并提高团队的产出、进而提高劳动力资源的配置效率方面都有着重要的作用。但是,现有研究对横向监督及其应用的精力投入却十分有限。本文在对现有文献进行综述的基础上对横向监督理论研究的发展与某些局限性进行探讨,并提出了自己的见解。
引用
收藏
页码:71 / 80
页数:10
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