外部机构投资者能否对传统内部治理机制产生影响

被引:15
作者
吴晓晖
姜彦福
机构
[1] 清华大学经济管理学院
关键词
机构投资者; 内部治理; 积极主义;
D O I
10.19616/j.cnki.bmj.2006.18.016
中图分类号
F832.51 [];
学科分类号
1201 ; 020204 ;
摘要
对全体上市公司样本以及机构投资者长期持股样本的经验分析表明,我国上市公司的内部治理结构并未因为机构投资者的出现而发生重大变化。同时,机构投资者的积极主义行为也未能显著改善上市公司的内部治理机制的运行状态。研究结果表明,现阶段机构投资者在干预公司内部治理方面并没有和它们的国外同行一样起到重要作用。
引用
收藏
页码:90 / 96
页数:7
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