中国的地方官员何以晋升:激励与选择

被引:20
作者
郦水清
陈科霖
田传浩
机构
[1] 浙江大学
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助;
关键词
官员晋升机制; 功绩制; 淘汰激励; 投资博弈; 官员晋升锦标赛; 竞赛模式;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D630.3 [人事管理];
学科分类号
摘要
对地方官员晋升机制的文献研究由来已久。通过对学术史的回顾,官员晋升领域的学术研究呈现出不断深化的趋势。就晋升锦标赛层面的功绩制晋升争论、硬指标考核下的淘汰型政治激励以及投资中博弈所带来的多任务应激结果出发,已有研究既有着相当的学术贡献,但又存在着分析层次、对象差异、操作机制以及实证方法等层面的问题。在此基础上,本文以标尺赛、锦标赛、资格赛与淘汰赛四种竞赛模式解构了官员晋升,并就未来的研究提出了可供深化的方向。
引用
收藏
页码:4 / 17+125 +125
页数:15
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