国有企业经理人行为激励的制度分析:以万家乐为例

被引:12
作者
谭劲松
黎文靖
机构
[1] 中山大学
[2] 中山大学 中国人民大学
关键词
万家乐; 高级管理人员; 剩余索取权; 剩余控制权; 顺德市; 国有企业经理; 经理人员; 偷懒行为; 道德风险行为; 企业制度安排; 机会主义行为; 预期任期; 效用最大化; 企业家; 行为激励;
D O I
10.19744/j.cnki.11-1235/f.2002.10.015
中图分类号
F272.91 [企业领导];
学科分类号
1201 ;
摘要
This article,by analyzing Wangjiale Corp.Ltd.situated in Shunde of Guangdong Province by way of example,will dissect the causes for low efficiency in China’s national enterprises.We think that this low efficiency originates from people within the company(PWC),particularly in the opportunist behavior of the high-ranking management.The results of this analysis indicate that the underlying deep causes for the prevalence of opportunist behavior of PWC are nothing but the arrangement by the currnet system of the national enterprises.The significance of this paper lies in the idea that in order to continue to further the reform in national enterprises and raise the efficiency of state-owned enter-prises,we cannot rely on partial"amelioration"or modification,instead,we must make a radical change in the present system concerned.
引用
收藏
页码:111 / 119+156 +156
页数:10
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