基础设施公私伙伴关系的激励机制

被引:8
作者
任志涛
机构
[1] 天津大学
关键词
公私伙伴关系; 激励机制; 基础设施; 政府部门; 民营部门;
D O I
10.16348/j.cnki.cn61-1336/c.2007.05.010
中图分类号
F283 [基本建设投资与经济效益]; F224 [经济数学方法];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070104 ;
摘要
我国的基础设施领域正在加快市场化进程,公私伙伴关系是其市场化的具体模式之一,本文从激励机制的角度进行分析,研究了信息不对称下政府部门和民营部门之间委托-代理关系的目标函数,公私伙伴关系下激励问题的博弈分析,指出了基础设施公私伙伴关系的激励机制的重要性。
引用
收藏
页码:27 / 32
页数:6
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