战略顾客下最惠顾客保证对提前购买的价值

被引:27
作者
计国君
杨光勇
机构
[1] 厦门大学管理学院
关键词
异质性; 最惠顾客保证; 战略等待; 配给风险; 支付意愿;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F224.3 [运筹学在经济中的应用]; F717 [各种商业企业]; F274 [企业供销管理];
学科分类号
1201 ; 020205 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 0202 ;
摘要
百货行业与零售行业频繁降价促销使得顾客会评估产品未来可能的获得性与价格,典型特征是利用等待,跨期选择购买时机.文中研究了顾客最大支付意愿事前异质和事后异质两种情形下最惠顾客保证的价值.最惠顾客保证是指销售商一旦降价销售,就对提前购买的顾客给予价格差额补偿.结论表明,在事前异质中,顾客理性购买.即使顾客最大支付意愿低于销售价格,也倾向于提前购买.最惠顾客保证通过创造隐性价格风险鼓励提前购买.而在事后异质中,销售商提供部分退货补偿,顾客体验购买.当顾客购买并保留的产品数量较小时,销售商的最优策略是降价销售剩余库存.最惠顾客保证通过创造隐性配给风险诱导提前购买.
引用
收藏
页码:16 / 25
页数:10
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