职业生涯模型研究综述

被引：1

作者：

吕鹏

陈小悦

机构：

[1] 清华大学经济管理学院

来源：

关键词：

经理人市场; 代理人; 多维度; 显性激励; 职业生涯;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F272 [企业计划与经营决策];

学科分类号：

1201 ;

摘要：

<正> 随着股份制的出现和企业规模的增长,现代企业所有权与经营权的分离已经成为常态。委托代理理论认为,由于所有者与经营者之间利益目标函数不一致、双方信息不对称、市场不确定性以及单个股东监督上的外部性这四大原因,使得道德风险性质

引用

页码：87 / 90

页数：4

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