董事会治理研究前沿问题综述

被引：2

作者：

谢珺

机构：

[1] 武汉大学经济与管理学院

来源：

基金：

教育部留学回国人员科研启动基金;

关键词：

公司治理; 董事会; 契约理论;

D O I：

10.16144/j.cnki.issn1002-8072.2011.03.012

中图分类号：

F276.6 [公司];

学科分类号：

摘要：

本文对近年来董事会治理研究成果的综述发现,董事会作为解决股东与经理人之间的代理人问题的关键性制度,在公司治理机制中发挥着极其重要的作用。由于数据缺乏和模型复杂等原因,与公司治理的其他领域相比,董事会治理的实证研究和理论研究都显得较为缺乏

引用

页码：109 / 112

页数：4

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