西方企业理论的演进与最新发展

被引：119

作者：

张维迎

余晖

机构：

[1] 北京大学中国问题研究中心

来源：

关键词：

企业家理论; 德姆塞茨; 阿尔钦; 杨小凯; 黄有光; 资本家; 契约理论; 剥削者; 企业管理; 企业; 管理者激励;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F270 [企业经济理论和方法];

学科分类号：

摘要：

<正> 近几十年来,新古典经济学的企业理论受到许多经济学家的挑战。所有这些挑战可分为三个分支:(1)企业的契约理论;(2)企业的企业家理论;(3)企业的管理者理论。下面我们将对此分别给予概述,但重点放在前两种理论上。在文章的结尾部分,我们也将作者本人的企业理论作一概述。

引用

页码：70 / 81

页数：12

共 11 条

[1] Why Capital Hires Labor: A Bargaining Perspective[J] . Gregory K. Dow.The American Economic Review . 1993 (1)
[2] PROPERTY-RIGHTS AND THE NATURE OF THE FIRM
HART, O
MOORE, J
[J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1990, 98 (06) : 1119 - 1158
[3] CREDIT RATIONING IN MARKETS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
STIGLITZ, JE
WEISS, A
[J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1981, 71 (03) : 393 - 410
[4] Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations[J] . Oliver E. Williamson.Journal of Law and Economics . 1979 (2)
[5] Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination[J] . Michael C. Jensen,William H. Meckling.The Journal of Business . 1979 (4)
[6] Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process[J] . Benjamin Klein,Robert G. Crawford,Armen A. Alchian.Journal of Law and Economics . 1978 (2)
[7] The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach[J] . The Bell Journal of Economics . 1977 (1)
[8] The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization[J] . The Bell Journal of Economics . 1976 (1)
[9] Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization[J] . Armen A. Alchian,Harold Demsetz.The American Economic Review . 1972 (5)
[10] Perception, Opportunity and Profit .2 Kirzner,I. M. Chicago University Press . 1970