农村小额信贷的激励理论述评

被引：6

作者：

董志勇

黄迈

刘文忻

机构：

[1] 北京大学经济学院

来源：

经济理论与经济管理 | 2008年 / 10期

关键词：

农村小额信贷; 连带责任; 道德风险; 逆向选择; 激励机制; 利率; 契约; 动态激励; 团体贷款; 借款人;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F830.5 [信贷];

学科分类号：

1201 ; 020204 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：27 / 31

页数：5

共 7 条

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