满足预算平衡的Pareto最优的团队激励契约

被引：4

作者：

骆品亮

郑绍濂

机构：

[1] 复旦大学管理学院!上海

来源：

复旦学报(自然科学版) | 2000年 / 05期

关键词：

团队; Pareto效率; 预算平衡; 委托人; Nash均衡;

D O I：

10.15943/j.cnki.fdxb-jns.2000.05.014

中图分类号：

O225 [对策论（博弈论）];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 1201 ;

摘要：

研究了团队中的搭便车现象 ,在对熟知的团队激励之Pareto效率与预算平衡不可兼达定理重新审视后 ,指出了监督固然可获Pareto效率 ,却引致渎职与合谋之隐患 ;当团队成员为风险中性型时 ,若组织规范能有效运作 ,或团队成员主观高估其行为对集体产出之影响时 ,即使监视人缺位 ,仍有可能存在Pareto有效的预算平衡的利益分享机制 ;而当团队成员为充分风险厌恶型且能忍受一定的经济惩罚时 ,监视人可设计一种随机性惩罚团队某成员的所谓“替罪羊”机制以达到Pareto效率与预算平衡之兼容 .

引用

页码：553 / 559

页数：7

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