销售人员的薪酬机制设计研究综述

被引：17

作者：

骆品亮

机构：

[1] 复旦大学管理学院!上海

来源：

关键词：

最优报酬机制; 销售人员; 代理理论; 销售定额; 提成比例; 实证分析;

D O I：

10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2001.01.015

中图分类号：

F244.1 [工资形式];

学科分类号：

摘要：

本文综述了关于销售人员最优报酬机制设计的代理理论模型及相应的实证分析 ,并结合契约理论的最新进展提出今后进一步研究的方向。

引用

页码：50 / 54+1 +1

页数：6

共 22 条

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