'Raise the stakes' evolves into a defector

被引:14
作者
Killingback, T [1 ]
Doebeli, M [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Basel, Inst Zool, CH-4051 Basel, Switzerland
关键词
D O I
10.1038/22913
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Sherratt and Roberts reply — Killingback and Doebeli argue that our cooperative strategy ‘raise the stakes’1 (RTS) can be continually undermined by selection for less generous strategies. They suggest that the “lack of robustness of RTS” arises from our use of a discontinuous strategy. However, this cannot be the case because the instability they report was in their reformulation of our model in continuous terms. Whether a continuous model is “essential” is debatable. Discontinuous strategies can be more realistic, particularly when resources are not infinitely divisible, hence our notion of a minimal non-zero investment of one unit.
引用
收藏
页码:518 / 518
页数:1
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