Environmental regulations, transfers, and trade: Theory and evidence

被引:47
作者
Eliste, P
Fredriksson, PG
机构
[1] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA
[2] W Virginia Univ, Nat Resources Econ Program, Morgantown, WV 26506 USA
[3] So Methodist Univ, Dept Econ, Dallas, TX 75275 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeem.2000.1176
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper develops a theory of compensation of producers for the costs associated with environmental regulations. We show that the existence of transfers can give counter-intuitive effects of environmental policy on both output and trade flows. In particular, the compensation obtained by producers neutralizes the effect of environmental policy on output, and consequently on trade flows. This may help explain why previous empirical research has found weak evidence that environmental regulations affect trade patterns. The theory is tested using agricultural sector data. The evidence supports the hypothesis that environmental regulations and transfers a-re positively correlated. (C) 2001 elsevier Science (USA).
引用
收藏
页码:234 / 250
页数:17
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