What Matters in Corporate Governance?

被引:1817
作者
Bebchuk, Lucian [1 ]
Cohen, Alma [1 ,2 ]
Ferrell, Allen
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, Olin Ctr Law Econ & Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Tel Aviv Univ, Dept Econ, NBER, Tel Aviv, Israel
关键词
POWERFUL ANTITAKEOVER FORCE; MARKET; OWNERSHIP; MECHANISMS; BOARDS; PILL;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhn099
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the relative importance of the twenty-four provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and included in the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick governance index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003). We put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. We find that increases in the index level are monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in firm valuation as well as large negative abnormal returns during the 1990-2003 period. The other eighteen IRRC provisions not in our entrenchment index were uncorrelated with either reduced firm valuation or negative abnormal returns. (JEL G30, G34, K22)
引用
收藏
页码:783 / 827
页数:45
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