International emissions trading: Good or bad?

被引：23

作者：

Holtsmark, Bjart ^{[1
]}

Sommervoll, Dag Einar ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Stat Norway, NO-0033 Oslo, Norway

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2012年 / 117卷 / 01期

关键词：

Climate change; International environmental agreements; Emissions trading; Non-cooperative game theory;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.034

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Using a non-cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：362 / 364

页数：3

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