Managing large-scale technology and inter-organizational relations: the case of the Channel Tunnel

This paper provides an analysis of the difficulties affecting the development of the Channel Tunnel fixed link. The study draws upon relevant concepts and concerns located in the disciplines of technology policy, decision theory and project management. It evaluates the inflexibility (and non-incrementality) of the Channel Tunnel project in terms of capital intensity, unit size, dependence upon specialized infrastructure and lead time. Hitherto, research has provided support for the hypothesis that technological projects characterized by the aforementioned factors will be unusually painful to develop, with adverse implications for their performance in operation. Studies of this type have analysed, amongst other subjects, the development of nuclear power and first generation North Sea oil fields: cases which contravene the prescriptions of incrementalism. Another aspect of the paper investigates the claim, also supported by previous research, that inflexible technology projects are promoted by centralized decision-making processes to the exclusion of legitimate stakeholders. A more flexible, incremental approach, on the other hand, would emphasize the mutual adjustment and coordination of various stakeholders. The theme of the paper referred to here relates to the implications of centralized decision making early in the Life of large-scale projects for subsequent inter-organizational conflict and the lack of the partnering or mutual approach that is widely accepted as being a key factor in the effective management of such projects. The research benefits from interviews with key participants in the Channel Tunnel project as well as from a wealth of secondary data. Conclusions drawn refer to the whether the findings of the research support or refute the incremental thesis and whether more flexible alternative options were available to decision makers. (C) 1997 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.