A backward induction experiment

被引：94

作者：

Binmore, K ^{[1
]}

McCarthy, J

Ponti, G

Samuelson, L

Shaked, A

机构：

[1] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA

[2] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England

[3] UCL, ELSE Expt Lab, London WC1E 6BT, England

[4] Univ Alicante, Dept Econ, Alicante 03071, Spain

[5] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, D-5300 Bonn, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 104卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会; 英国经济与社会研究理事会;

关键词：

bargaining; experiments; backward induction; subgame-perfect equilibrium; interdependent preferences;

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2001.2910

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their monetary payoffs and performing backward induction calculations. We examine whether, given payoff-interdependent preferences, players respect backward induction. To do this, we break backward induction into its components, subgame consistency and truncation consistency. We examine each by comparing the outcomes of two-stage bargaining games with one-stage games with varying rejection payoffs. We find and characterize systematic violations of both subgame and truncation consistency. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

引用

页码：48 / 88

页数：41

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