AUCTIONING MANY DIVISIBLE GOODS

被引：51

作者：

Ausubel, Lawrence M. ^{[1
]}

Cramton, Peter ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION | 2004年 / 2卷 / 2-3期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/154247604323068168

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner's curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder's decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical considerations in applying them. (JEL: D44)

引用

页码：480 / 493

页数：14

共 14 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 2002, DEMAND REDUCTION INE

[2]

[Anonymous], 2002, CONTRIBUTIONS EC ANA

[3]

[Anonymous], 9607 U MAR

[4]

[Anonymous], WORKING PAPER

[5]

Ausubel Lawrence M., 2004, EC THEORY IN PRESS

[6]

Ausubel Lawrence M., 1997, AM EC REV IN PRESS

[7]

Ausubel LawrenceM, 2002, International Patent Application No, Patent No. [PCT/US02/16937, 0216937]

[8]

Compte Olivier, 2000, WORKING PAPER

[9]

Laan Gerard van der, 1987, COMPUTATION MODELLIN

[10]

Milgrom P, 2004, Putting auction theory to work

← 1 2 →