Merger effect of two firms under network equilibrium

被引:3
作者
Matsubayashi, N
Umezawa, M
Masuda, Y
Nishino, H
机构
[1] NTT Commun, IP Network Serv Dept, Tama Ku, Kawasaki, Kanagawa 2140037, Japan
[2] Keio Univ, Fac Sci & Technol, Kohoku Ku, Yokohama, Kanagawa 2238522, Japan
关键词
pricing; wardrop equilibrium; Bertrand price competition; merger effect;
D O I
10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00103-5
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper studies the merger effect of two firms under the price competition of n firms, represented by n nodes on a linear network equilibrium model. The difference of profits between pre- and post-merger of the two firms can be described explicitly in terms of the substitution matrix. In general, the evaluation of the merger effect requires the knowledge of the substitution effects among all n nodes. For some interesting special cases, however, we obtain simple qualitative results. Specifically, the profitability of the merger can be predicted from the substitution effect of the two firms. Numerical examples exhibit the usefulness of our results. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:434 / 447
页数:14
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