Proprietary Costs and the Disclosure of Information About Customers

被引:285
作者
Ellis, Jesse A. [1 ]
Fee, C. Edward [2 ]
Thomas, Shawn E. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Alabama, Culverhouse Coll Business, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 USA
[2] Michigan State Univ, Eli Broad Coll, Dept Finance, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA
[3] Univ Pittsburgh, Katz Grad Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
关键词
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE; DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE; FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE; COMPETITIVE COSTS; CAPITAL-MARKET; BIOTECH IPOS; SUPPLY CHAIN; INCENTIVES; FIRMS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00441.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In deciding how much information about their firms customers to disclose, managers face a trade off between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry with capital market participants and the costs of aiding competitors by revealing proprietary information. This paper investigates the determinants of managers choices to disclose information about their firms customers using a comprehensive data set of customer-information disclosures over the period 19762006. We find robust evidence in support of the hypothesis that proprietary costs are an important factor in firms disclosure choices regarding information about large customers.
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页码:685 / 728
页数:44
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