Mediated power and outsourcing relationships

被引:100
作者
Handley, Sean M. [1 ]
Benton, W. C., Jr. [2 ]
机构
[1] Rutgers State Univ, Rutgers Business Sch, Dept Supply Chain Management & Mkt Sci, Newark, NJ 07102 USA
[2] Ohio State Univ, Dept Management Sci, Fisher Coll Business, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
Outsourcing; Inter-organizational power; Inter-organizational control; Strategic sourcing; BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS; CHAIN MANAGEMENT; INTERFIRM RELATIONSHIPS; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS; PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES; COUNTERVAILING POWER; DEPENDENCE RELATIONS; INFLUENCE STRATEGIES; CONSTRUCT-VALIDITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jom.2011.11.004
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Mediated power is often used by firms to control the behaviors or influence the decisions of other members of the value chain. Interestingly, significant contributions in the academic literature offer consistent evidence that the use of mediated power has a negative impact on the quality of inter-organizational relationships. Yet, there is a dearth of empirical research investigating the conditions under which the use of mediated power is more or less prevalent. Utilizing dyadic data collected on 102 outsourcing relationships, this study evaluates how the buying firm's dependence on the service provider, asserted importance of the outsourced activity, and difficulties with other inter-organizational control mechanisms are related to their reliance on mediated power. Results from our hierarchical regression analysis support the hypotheses that the use of mediated power is diminished when the buyer is currently more dependent on the service provider due to switching difficulties and the buyer has a higher expectation of future supply market consolidation. Similar hypotheses regarding the effect of the strategic importance of the outsourced activity and entry barriers to the service provider's market were not supported. The results also support the hypothesis that the use of mediated power is more pronounced when the buyer experiences contract management difficulties, but the same is not true when the buyer has difficulty in monitoring the provider. To our knowledge, these findings represent the first empirical explanation of conditions which either attenuate or exacerbate the use of mediated power by outsourcing organizations. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:253 / 267
页数:15
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