Opportunity and social mobility

被引：28

作者：

Phelan, Christopher ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Fed Reserve Bank Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN 55480 USA

[2] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 2006年 / 73卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00384.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper argues that both unequal opportunity and social mobility are necessary implications of an efficient societal arrangement when incentives must be provided.

引用

页码：487 / 504

页数：18

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