CEO Compensation and Board Structure

被引：295

作者：

Chhaochharia, Vidhi ^{[1
]}

Grinstein, Yaniv ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA

[2] Cornell Univ, Johnson Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2009年 / 64卷 / 01期

关键词：

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DETERMINANTS; SIZE; DIRECTORS; PAY;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying industry effects, size, and performance. The decrease in compensation is particularly pronounced in the subset of affected firms with no outside blockholder on the board and in affected firms with low concentration of institutional investors. Our results suggest that the new board requirements affected CEO compensation decisions.

引用

页码：231 / 261

页数：31

共 40 条

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